DOI: 10.25136/2409-8728.2023.11.69032

Abstract: The article deals with the question of Plato's reception in Heidegger's philosophy. In particular, the research focuses on the question of how Heidegger interpreted the idea of the good from Plato's "State". Here a number of difficulties important for the history of philosophy arise. What is the ontological status of the idea of good? How is the idea of the good connected with the demiurge from the dialogue "Timaeus"? On the one hand, it is well known that the late Heidegger criticized Plato and all European metaphysics, which was and remains Platonism. On the other hand, the early Heidegger clearly presents an attempt to master the shining heights of Platonism: the question of the meaning of being needs an angle from which a definite answer can be highlighted – and Heidegger borrows this angle from Plato. Just as the good endows existence with being and truth, so the understanding of being is possible from time, because it is temporality that is the condition for understanding being, it highlights its meaning. And if Plato's being "pounces" on the good, or on the one, then for Heidegger, time is such a condition. This line of thought, fundamental to the whole project of fundamental ontology, is directly related to the philosophy of Plato, who for the first time was able to rise so high as to become ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, to see things as if from the outside, i.e. in the light of the transcendent idea of good. Nevertheless, Heidegger criticizes Plato, which allows us to raise the question: how did Heidegger understand Platonic ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας and the doctrine of the good? It is impossible to answer this question unequivocally, since Heidegger approached this question from different sides and at different times interpreted this most important position of the Greek thinker in different ways. Nevertheless, the main remarks can be reduced to two: (1) the good was conceived by Plato as something moral and therefore mixed with the existing, (2) the good subordinates the being, brings it under fitness.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2023.10.68750

Abstract: The article deals with Heidegger’s interpretation of antique ontology, in which Being was conceptualized in terms of production. What is this interpretation and why is it so important? Until recently, it has been difficult to answer these questions, since the texts in question have only in recent years become publicly available, and therefore have not yet been fully absorbed in Heideggerian-studies. Consequently, even the very useful works that cover the subject of production-theme in Heidegger focus more on the question of technique and do not consider the formation of this problematic, and therefore do not deal with it substantively. In the years 1921-1924, Heidegger was closely involved with Aristotle and lectured on his favorite philosopher for four years. It was during this period that he began to interpret Being in Aristotle as being-made, being-produced (das Hergestelltsein), and then extended this interpretation to the whole of ancient and medieval philosophy. This is a very remarkable moment in terms of methodology that characterizes Heidegger as a historian of philosophy. In this article, the author examines Heidegger’s interpretation of ancient ontology, revealing its weaknesses.

DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2023.9.44027

Abstract: The article examines some aspects of Brentano's ontology, starting with his 1862 dissertation "On the ambiguity of Being according to Aristotle", as well as its influence on the philosophy of M. Heidegger. The author shows that the ontology of the early Brentano is not limited to ousiology, since it includes a discussion of the field of mental being (ens rationis, ὂν ὡς ἀληθές) and it is in this aspect that he influences the young Heidegger. Following Aristotle, Brentano assigns a central role to the ontology of essence, which in the late period leads him to the position of reism, but in the lectures of the middle period Brentano discusses the problems of intentional inexistence, thanks to which projects of "new types of ontology" by Husserl and Mainong appear. The author believes that Heidegger was also influenced by these ideas. Of course, there are fundamental differences between the positions of Brentano and Heidegger, but the similarities are quite large. In particular, if Brentano, highlighting the real and true areas, gives preference in favor of the former, then Heidegger's ontology is built on the second member of this opposition. In particular, everything that can be given is called being by Heidegger, because we are talking about intentional being, about ens rationis, or ὂν ὡς ἀληθές