О феноменальных концептах Лоара

Прись Игорь Евгеньевич

doi:10.7256/2454-0757.2014.10.10528


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Philosophy and Culture

Reference:

Pris F. // Philosophy and Culture. 2014. № 10. P. 1488-1494. DOI: 10.7256/2454-0757.2014.10.10528 URL: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=10528

О феноменальных концептах Лоара

Pris' Igor'

Senior Researcher, Institute of Philosophy

220012, Belarus, g. Minsk, ul. Surganova, 1, of. 810

frigpr@gmail.com

Other publications by this author

Article was published in rubric "Phenomenology"

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0757.2014.10.10528

Received:

16-10-2014

Published:

30-10-2014

References

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