The social credit system in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China

Buyarov Dmitrii Vladimirovich ORCID: 0000-0002-8337-6817 PhD in Philosophy Associate Professor; Department of General History, Philosophy and Cultural Studies; Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical University 675000, Russia, Amur region, Blagoveshchensk, Lenin str., 104, room 456 buyarov_d@mail.ru Other publications by this author

For thousands of years, the population in China has been subject to state control. As Sima Qian noted back in the IV century BC, the people were divided into groups of 5 and 10 families to monitor each other and take collective responsibility. In the XI century, the term "baojia" appeared, meaning the system of administrative and police organization of peasant households into units of "bao" - hundred yards and "jia" – thousand yards.

After the formation of the People's Republic of China, the Danwei system began to be introduced in the country in the form of territorial work cells. The solution of most of the workers' issues was related to danwei (medical care, housing, goods and food, etc.). At the same time, Danwei controlled the workers, since movements to other settlements, marriage and the birth of children also had to be approved by the leadership of the working cells. employees who did not comply with the steam could be fired from their jobs, deprived of benefits and end up on the street ^[1].

There were also two systems in China for collecting information about citizens. Firstly, "dangan" – which fixed labor and social relations, combining a personal matter and a characteristic of a citizen. Secondly, "hukou", which included information about the household and relatives. The hukou recorded the name, date and place of birth, place of residence, parents, spouses, children, marriages and divorces ^[14]. At that time they were in printed form, today they are in electronic form.

The new realities of the information society also required new approaches from the state. The social credit system was conceived in the context of market reforms and its idea was first formulated in 1999, when the then Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Zhu Rongji, sought to make it easier for foreign firms to obtain information about their Chinese partners ^[17]. The system was originally planned for the commercial, not the public sector. As China moved from a planned economy to a market economy, it needed a social credit system to regulate counterfeit products and market fraud. This was supposed to help China's transition to a credit economy where non-cash instruments such as credit cards would be important. However, in 2012 it was decided to extend this system to the social and political spheres as well.

For many years after this system was mentioned at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002 as part of the party's efforts to create a "unified, open, competitive and orderly modern market system", it was discussed in official documents only in the context of market reforms ^[12]. In 2007, at the Interministerial Conference on Building a Social Credit System, consisting mainly of government agencies responsible for development, trade and taxation, credit, tax and contract reports were proposed as potential elements of social credit status ^[5].

 This relatively unremarkable initiative of economic innovations in 2014 turned into a digital reform project covering the entire society, with the announcement of a Plan for building a social credit system (the "2014 Plan"). According to the document, the system should function as a nationwide incentive mechanism, collecting information on social loans from each person and enterprise in order to reward for "maintaining trust" and punish for "behavior that violates trust" ^[6]. Although the original goal of reducing transaction costs in the market has not changed, the scale of the system, as indicated in the 2014 Plan, is no longer limited to the economy. The aim of the project was also to promote a "culture of honesty and sincerity" in all sectors of society, including the government, the judiciary, private enterprises and public organizations ^[5]. In 2014, 12 cities with a good level of economic development were selected for the experiment, among them were Nanjing, Weihai, Suzhou, Hangzhou, etc.

They also began to implement this system in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which was chosen because of ethnic instability. After the major terrorist attack in Urumqi in May 2014, Xi Jinping announced an assimilationist approach to ethnic politics. At the same time, the growing dependence of the population on high-tech supervision was declared one of the main tools. The fact is that since 2010, surveillance cameras have been installed en masse in the XUAR. With the appointment of Chen Quanguo as the new chairman of the XUAR Party in 2016, a police system of "grid-style management" began to be introduced, which segmented urban neighborhoods into geometric zones. Their protection is carried out by "convenient" police stations connected to video surveillance cameras (CCTV) and police databases, which provides more extensive surveillance capabilities. In Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo integrated this mechanism with video surveillance systems already installed in the region, resulting in a multi-level police system based on an exponential set of contract police officers to staff "convenient" police stations. Later, GPS trackers were installed in cars, face recognition scanners were used at checkpoints and large public facilities, and applications were installed that remove "subversive" materials from smartphones.

By 2017, the Interministerial Conference included representatives of a wide range of government departments, including the Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the National Bureau of Statistics ^[24]. The 2014 Plan outlined several features that set it apart from the previous reform policy. First, it is the disclosure on the Internet of the identity of the punished and encouraged persons. When a person commits acts that violate trust, the name and code of the person's social credit are published in the blacklist along with details about the act and subsequent legal sanctions; the same applies to affirmative action ^[8]. These so-called "black" and "red" lists are available for public search. Secondly, the system operates on the principle of joint punishment and reward; as soon as it is discovered that a person has committed a prohibited act, he is faced with restrictions on a wide range of actions directly or indirectly related to such behavior. For example, failure to comply with a court decision may lead to restrictions not only on applications for government subsidies or certain professional licenses, but also on the sale of assets, doing business, using transport and consuming luxury goods ^[23]. Online identity disclosure and a joint incentive mechanism together aim to prevent individuals who violate the rules from going unnoticed and avoiding consequences.

Currently, the system is designed to function as a data-based platform for public censure and interactive propaganda. According to Chinese judicial tradition, the court often announces the verdict of a criminal in a public place, symbolically asserting the party's control over public places and at the same time informing citizens about the cost of violating the law ^[20]. The social rating system transfers this model to the online space, revealing people's identities, details of their behavior and subsequent punishments. The system also functions as a propaganda channel that permeates both the online and offline world. Previously, even if the government publicly condemned a person in newspapers or at film screenings, these statements often went unnoticed by people who did not use these media ^[3]. People on the "black" and "red" lists contribute to the dissemination of government ideas by acting as visual models from which others can take an example. The concepts of "black" and "red" lists have become official in Chinese documents and the press ^[25].

The reaction to this system, in China as a whole, is largely restrained. In part, this reaction is cultural in nature, as the Chinese view of privacy differs from Western political and legal thought. Traditional Confucian philosophy values morality above respect for individual rights as the guiding principle of interpersonal relations and the management of society ^[10]. Since the conceptual barrier between each person is not clear, confidentiality has traditionally meant family intimacy or shameful secrets. Chinese law, with the exception of specific provisions such as protection from unlawful search or detention, usually interprets the right to privacy mainly as the right to preserve one's reputation from insults and slander ^[21]. It also helps that the Chinese are no strangers to arbitrary and extended forms of surveillance. And in comparison with dangan, the social rating system is not perceived as unacceptable. In the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, such a control system is certainly more discontented, but ethnic minorities have to put up with it.

Monitoring and collection of various data is carried out throughout the country. In Xinjiang, where the Uighur Muslim minority lives, the government collects a wide range of information about citizens, including, among other things, DNA samples, iris scans, voice samples. Applications installed on phones capture messages and records about the authorities, in order to search for "potential criminals". XUAR officials are required to respond to alleged "abnormal" behavior. In fact, detailed monitoring of the movement of citizens and social relations facilitates the arbitrary and indefinite detention of representatives of national minorities in retraining centers (political re-education camps). Representatives of the Xinjiang Industrial and Construction Complex joined the Interministerial Conference from XUAR.

The social credit system is also a measure of disciplinary action against CPC members and holding them accountable for bureaucratic violations, ranging from the loss and theft of important documents to falsification of official statistics ^[4]. In China, overcoming bureaucratic obstacles is the biggest challenge for business ^[16]. Moreover, corruption in regulatory bodies has caused the largest scandals in the field of public health and safety in the country ^[11].

The party leadership has long recognized the need to reform the administrative system. A highly decentralized policy development and implementation mechanism, in which the central government announces broadly defined goals and regional governments experiment with detailed policy measures, stimulates productive competition between officials from different provinces, but also makes it difficult for the central government to monitor and control the implementation of local policies ^[8]. Taking advantage of this information asymmetry, local officials in some cases resist and distort the instructions of the central government and put their interests first.

The elimination of administrative dysfunctions and abuses requires transparency and accountability within the party organization, but too many are interested in maintaining organizational difficulties and an informal tradition of exchanging services that they can use ^[8]. The social rating system helps to solve this dilemma by simplifying administrative procedures, while allowing the party leadership to maintain control over national policy.           

In fact, since the 1990s, the party leadership has shown considerable enthusiasm for the potential of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to increase government transparency without undermining its authority ^[16]. In this context, the 2014 Plan states that the successful management of government affairs is key to ensuring sincerity in the rest of society, and calls for improved data collection and evaluation to "increase confidence in government functions"^[6].

For many years, the CPC leadership has considered consolidating its data management structure as a political priority. In 2014, Xi Jinping personally headed the Central Cybersecurity and Informatization Group to develop policy guidelines coordinated by the State Council ^[9]. The National Intelligence Act of 2017 requires companies to cooperate with the government ^[19]. The Cybersecurity Law, adopted in 2017, covers a wide range of issues, including the digital economy, security, data, encryption, content management and infrastructure ^[18]. Shortly before the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the previously undisclosed Chinese Cyberspace Administration published an article explaining China's strategy to become a "cyber superpower" ^[13]. Recognizing that cyberspace has become a new area of global competition, the article suggests that Chinese Internet governance practices will become a future "international model."

The pandemic has also influenced the change in attitudes towards the concept of "privacy protection". Data processing technologies are contributing to the global response to the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19). In China, drones flew around neighborhoods to monitor pedestrians without masks; in cities, citizens had to scan their QR codes to enter public places or use public transportation.

Since January 2021, a new civil code has been adopted in the People's Republic of China, which officially legalized the social rating system for individuals. Government agencies and private companies collect huge amounts of data about a person's finances, social media activities, credit history, medical records, online purchases, tax payments, legal issues and the people they communicate with. All this is complemented by images taken from surveillance cameras with facial recognition software. Initially, such organizations as Ant Financial Services Group and Tencent were engaged in the development of software for the system, later Alipay became the leader with its Sesame Credit system ^[2]. Messengers are actively used to collect information: "WeChat" and "TencentQQ", as well as the social network "Qzone".

The ratings are determined by the National Development and Reform Commission, the People's Bank of China and the Chinese judicial system. Offenses related to social credit range from non-payment of individual taxes or fines to drug use. Other violations include using expired tickets, smoking on a train, or walking a dog without a leash. Spending too much and for too long on video games and spreading fake news can also play against individuals. In Xinjiang, points can be deducted for frequent visits to mosques or frequent calls abroad.

On the other hand, good deeds such as donations to charity and volunteer activities add points to a credit rating. Citizens with a high social rating get access to certain benefits, such as: lower interest rates on loans, priority when applying for jobs in government institutions; quotas for obtaining social housing, various kinds of discounts and benefits, etc.

If a person has a low social credit rating, they will not be able to buy what they want, for example, high-quality goods or a new house. Such citizens may also be prohibited from buying air tickets and train tickets or renting an apartment. Some people with low social credit scores may be blocked from dating sites and will not be able to enroll their children in the school of their choice or go to university. They are also punished by a ban on working in public institutions; they may be denied social security; they may be subjected to particularly thorough customs inspection; they are prohibited from holding senior positions in the food and pharmaceutical industry; they are denied luxury hotel rooms and restaurants. According to the latest statistics, 27 million people are included in the block list restricting air travel, and 6 million people are included in the block list restricting access to high-speed trains.

Currently, most Chinese citizens have a positive attitude towards the existing commercial social credit systems. A survey of citizens shows that 80% of respondents approve of social credit systems to some extent or completely. They perceive change as a more effective and efficient way to encourage good behavior and protect against fraud and bad business.   

The Chinese corporate social credit system was originally conceived as a mechanism for assessing the reliability of business entities ^[22]. And as the results of its ten–year operation show, it copes with this task.  The social credit system is based on the current legal system, which, despite its strictness and orientation towards traditional values, justifies its existence. But today its purpose is broader. The social credit system allows you to control the behavior of ordinary citizens in various spheres of society. And this is confirmed by a slight decrease in the level of extremism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where the social credit system operates in a preventive vector.

The social credit system includes such principles as hybrid intelligence, centralism combined with modularity, social rating and replication of this system in the world. In addition, since the concept of privacy is itself constructed by society, what is considered confidential personal information will change over time.

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